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Computing technologies pervade physical spaces and human lives, and produce vast amount of data
that is available for analysis. However, there is a growing concern that potentially sensitive data
may become public if the collected data are not appropriately sanitized before being released for
investigation. Although there are more than a few privacy-preserving methods available, they are not
efficient, scalable or have problems with data utility, and/or privacy. This paper addresses these issues
by proposing an efficient and scalable nonreversible perturbation algorithm, PABIDOT, for privacy
preservation of big data via optimal geometric transformations. PABIDOT was tested for efficiency,
scalability, resistance, and accuracy using nine datasets and five classification algorithms. Experiments
show that PABIDOT excels in execution speed, scalability, attack resistance and accuracy in large-
scale privacy-preserving data classification when compared with two other, related privacy-preserving
algorithms.
Keywords: Information privacy, privacy preserving data mining, big data privacy, data
perturbation, big data.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in computer technologies have drastically increased the amount of data collected
from cyber, physical and human worlds. Data collection at large scale can make sense only if they
are actionable and they can be used in decision making [47]. Data mining helps at this point by
investigating unsuspected relationships in the data and providing useful insights to the data owners.
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Moreover, such capabilities may often need to be shared with external parties for further analysis. In
this process, various kinds of information may be revealed, which can lead to a privacy breach. The
ability to share information while preventing the disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII)
becomes an important aspect of information privacy, and it is one of the most significant technical,
legal, ethical and social challenges. In fact, various governmental and commercial organizations collect
vast amounts of user data, among others individual credit information, health, financial status, and
personal preferences. Social networking, banking and healthcare systems are examples of systems that
handle such private information [9], and they often overlook privacy due to indirect use of private
information. There are other information systems that use massive amounts of sensitive private infor-
mation (also called big data) for modeling and prediction of human-related phenomena such as crimes
[19], epidemics [21] and grand challenges in social physics [8]. Hence, privacy preservation (a.k.a.
sanitization) [43] can become a very complex problem and requires robust solutions [45].
Privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) offers the possibility of using data mining methods with-
out disclosing private information. PPDM approaches include data perturbation (data modification)
[10, 11] and encryption [25]. Cryptographic methods are renowned for securing data. Literature pro-
vides many examples where PPDM effectively utilize cryptographic methods [27]. For example, we
can find applications of homomorphic encryption in the domains including but not limited to e-health,
cloud computing and sensor networks [50]. Secure sum, secure set union, scalar product and set inter-
section are few other operations that can be used as building blocks in distributed data mining [12].
However, due to their high computational complexity, they cannot provide sufficient data utility [16]
and are impractical for PPDM. Data perturbation is known to have lower computational complexity
compared to cryptographic methods for privacy preservation [9]. Data perturbation maintains indi-
vidual record confidentiality by applying a systematic modification to the data elements in a database
[9]. The perturbed dataset is often indistinguishable from the original dataset, e.g. age data maps to
a reasonable number so that a third party cannot differentiate between original and perturbed age.
Examples of perturbation techniques include adding noise to the original data (additive perturbation)
[31], applying rotation to the original data using a random rotation matrix (random rotation) [10],
applying both rotation and translation to the original data using a random rotation matrix and a ran-
dom translation matrix (geometric perturbation) [11], and randomizing the outputs of user responses
using some random algorithm (randomized response) [14]. A major disadvantage of these techniques
is that they can not process high volumes of data efficiently, e.g. random rotation and geometric
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perturbation consume a considerable amount of time to provide good results while enforcing sufficient
privacy [10, 11]. Additive perturbation takes less time but provides a lower privacy guarantee [33].
The existing methods have issues in maintaining a proper balance between privacy and utility.
It is essential to define the effectiveness of a privacy-preserving approach using a privacy model,
and identify the limitations of private information protection and disclosure [9]. K − anonymity,
l−diversity, (α, k)−anonymity, t−closeness are some of the previous privacy models, and they show
vulnerability to different attacks, e.g. minimality, composition and foreground knowledge attacks [9].
Differential privacy (DP) is a privacy model known to render maximum privacy by minimizing the
chance of individual record identification [14]. Local differential privacy (LDP), achieved by input
perturbation [14], allows full or partial data release to analysts [24] by randomizing the individual
instances of a database [40]. Global differential privacy (GDP), also called the trusted curator model,
allows analysts only to request the curator to run queries on the database. The curator applies carefully
calibrated noise to the query results to provide differential privacy [14, 24]. However, GDP and LDP
fail for small datasets, as accurate estimation of the statistics shows poor results when the number of
tuples is small. Although differential privacy has been studied thoroughly, only a few viable solutions
exist towards full/partial data release using LDP. Most of these are solutions for categorical data such
as RAPPOR [15] and Local, Private, Efficient Protocols for Succinct Histograms [36]. DP’s solid,
theoretically appealing foundation for privacy protection has limited the practicality of implementing
efficient solutions towards big data. Furthermore, existing LDP algorithms include a significant amount
of noise addition (i.e. randomization), resulting in low data utility. Accordingly, utility and privacy
often appear as conflicting factors, and improved privacy usually entails reduced utility.
The main contribution of this paper is a new Privacy preservation Algorithm for Big Data Us-
ing Optimal geometric Transformations (PABIDOT). PABIDOT is an irreversible input perturbation
mechanism with a new privacy model (Φ − separation) which facilitates full data release. We prove
that Φ− separation provides an empirical privacy guarantee against the data reconstruction attacks.
PABIDOT is substantially faster than comparable methods; it sequentially applies random axis reflec-
tion, noise translation, and multidimensional concatenated subplane rotation followed by randomized
expansion and random tuple shuffling for further randomization. Randomized expansion is a novel
method to increase the positiveness or the negativeness of a particular data instance. PABIDOT’s mem-
ory overhead is comparatively close to other solutions, and it provides better attack resistance, classifi-
cation accuracy, and excellent efficiency towards big data. We tested PABIDOT by using nine generic
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datasets retrieved from the UCI machine learning data repository1 and the OpenML machine learning
data repository2, the results were compared against two alternatives: random rotation perturbation
(RP) [10] and geometric perturbation (GP) [11], which are known to provide high utility in terms of
privacy-preserving classification. Our study shows that PABIDOT always ends up with approximately
optimal perturbation. PABIDOT produces the best empirical privacy possible by determining the glob-
ally optimal perturbation parameters adhering to Φ−separation for the dataset of interest. The source
code of the PABIDOT project is available at https : //github.com/chamikara1986/PABIDOT .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of existing related work.
The technical details of PABIDOT are described in Section 3. Section 3 further presents the basic
flow of PABIDOT which we refer as PABIDOT basic for convenience. The efficiency optimization of
PABIDOT is discussed in Section 4. At the end of Section 4, the main algorithm (PABIDOT) with
optimized efficiency is introduced. Section 4 presents experimental settings and provides a comparative
analysis of performance and resistance of PABIDOT. The results are discussed in Section 6, and the
paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. Literature Review
Privacy protection of individuals has become a challenging task with the proliferation of Internet-
enabled consumer technologies. Literature shows different approaches to find solutions towards this
challenge. While some approaches concentrate on increasing the awareness [7], others try to employ
different techniques to enforce individual privacy [44]. Above all, the massive volumes of big data intro-
duce many challenges to privacy preservation [13]. Although the security and privacy concerns of big
data are not entirely new, they require attention due to the specifics of the environments and dynam-
ics put forward by the devices used [26]. The advancements of these environments and the diversity
of devices always introduce increased complexity and make security and privacy preservation com-
plex. To counter the diversified challenges and complexities, three different technological approaches
can be observed: disclosure control, privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) and privacy-enhancing
technologies [41]. Attribute-based encryption, controlling access via authentication, temporal and
location-based access control and employing constraint-based protocols are some mechanisms that are
used for improving the privacy of systems in dynamic environments [9]. Among the various approaches
1http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/index.php
2https://www.openml.org
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to privacy-preserving data mining, data perturbation is often preferred due to its simplicity and ef-
ficiency [4]. Both input and output perturbation are often used: output perturbation is based on
noise addition and rule hiding while input perturbation is conducted either by noise addition [31] or
multiplication [9]. Input perturbation can be divided further into unidimensional perturbation and
multidimensional perturbation [33]. Additive perturbation [31], randomized response [14], swapping
[18] and microaggregation [42] are examples of unidimensional input perturbation, whereas conden-
sation [2], random rotation [10], geometric perturbation [11], random projection [28], and hybrid
perturbation are multidimensional [4].
In additive perturbation, random noise is added to the original data in such a way that the under-
lying statistical properties of the attributes are preserved. A significant problem with this approach is
low utility of the resulting data [3]. Additionally, effective noise reconstruction techniques developed
in response can significantly reduce the level of privacy [33]. Randomization techniques such as ran-
domized response is another approach [14], e.g. randomizing the responses of interviewees in order
to preserve the privacy of respondents. Due to the high randomization of input data, randomization
techniques such as randomized response often provide high privacy whereas the utility in terms of esti-
mating statistics or conducting analyses can be low [14]. Microaggregation is based on confidentiality
rules that allow the publication of micro datasets. It divides the dataset into clusters of k elements and
replaces the values in each cluster with the centroid of the cluster. Microaggregation to a single variable
(univariate microaggregation) is vulnerable to transparency attacks when the published data includes
information about the protection method and its parameters [42]. Multivariate microaggregation has
also been proposed, but it is complex and has been proven to be NP-hard [42]. In condensation, the
input dataset is divided into multiple groups of a pre-defined size in such a way that the difference
between records in a particular group is minimal, and a certain level of statistical information about
the different records is maintained in each group. Then sanitized data are generated using uniform
random distribution based on the eigenvectors which are generated using the eigendecomposition of
the characteristic covariance matrices of each homogeneous group [2]. Condensation has a significant
shortcoming in that it may degrade the quality of data significantly.
Random rotation perturbation, geometric data perturbation, and random projection perturbation
are three types of matrix multiplicative [33] methods. In random rotation, the original data matrix
is multiplied using a random rotation matrix that has the properties of an orthogonal matrix. The
application of rotation is repeated until the algorithm converges at the desired level of privacy [10]. In
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geometric data perturbation, a random translation matrix is incorporated in the process of perturba-
tion in order to enhance privacy. The method accompanies three components: rotation perturbation,
translation perturbation, and distance perturbation [11]. The main idea of random projection pertur-
bation is to project data from high-dimensional space to a randomly chosen low-dimensional subspace
[28]. Due to the isometric nature of transformations, random rotation perturbation, geometric data
perturbation, and random projection perturbation are capable of preserving the distances between tu-
ples in a dataset [10, 11, 28]. Accordingly, they provide high utility w.r.t. classification and clustering.
In hybrid perturbation, both matrix multiplicative and matrix additive properties are used, which is
quite similar to geometric perturbation [4]. These algorithms have high computational complexity
and are time-consuming, which make them unsuitable to work with big datasets.
Due to its explicit notion of strong privacy guarantee, differential privacy has attracted much
attention. Although LDP permits full or partial data release, and the analysis of privacy-protected
data [14, 24], LDP algorithms are still at a fundamental stage when it comes to the privacy preservation
of real-valued numerical data. The complexity of selecting the domain of randomization with respect to
a single data instance is still a challenge [15]. In GDP, the requirement of a trusted curator who enforces
differential privacy by applying noise or randomization can be considered as a primary issue [14]. The
fundamental mechanisms used to obtain differential privacy include Laplace mechanism, Gaussian
mechanism [14], geometric mechanism, randomized response, and staircase mechanisms [24]. The
necessity of a trusted third party in GDP and the application of extremely high noise in LDP are
inherent shortcomings that directly affect the balance between privacy and utility of these practical,
differentially private approaches.
Many previously proposed privacy preservation methods, including data perturbation, perform
poorly with high dimensional datasets. The necessary computing resources grow fast as the number of
attributes and number of instances increase even though the performance is good for low dimensional
data. This quality is often referred to as “The Dimensionality Curse” [9]. Large datasets also provide
extra information to attackers, as higher dimensions help in utilizing background knowledge to identify
individuals [6].
Most of the privacy-preserving algorithms have problems with balancing privacy and utility. Data
privacy focuses on the difficulty of estimating the original data from the sanitized data, while utility
concentrates on preserving application-specific properties/information [1]. A generic way of measuring
the utility of a privacy-preserving method is to investigate perturbation biases [46]. Data perturbation
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bias means that the result of a query on the perturbed data is significantly different from the result
generated for the same query on the original data. Wilson et al. have examined different data
perturbation methods against various bias measures [46], namely, A, B, C, D, and Data Mining (DM)
bias. Type A bias occurs when the perturbation of a given attribute causes summary measures to
change. Type B bias is the result of the perturbation changing the relationships between confidential
attributes, while in case of Type C bias the relationship between confidential and non-confidential
attributes changes. Type D bias means that the underlying distribution of the data was affected by
the sanitization process. If Type DM bias exists, data mining tools will perform less accurately on the
perturbed data than they would on the original dataset. It has been noted that privacy preservation
mechanisms decrease utility in general, and finding a trade-off between privacy protection and data
utility for big data is an important issue [49].
In the literature, there is a dearth of efficient privacy preservation methods that provide reliable
data utility and are scalable enough to handle the rapidly growing data. Existing methods also have
problems with levels of uncertainty, biases and low level of resistance. To address the issues presented
by big data, there is an urgent need for methods that are scalable, efficient and robust. New methods
should overcome the aforementioned weaknesses of the existing PPDM methods and provide solutions
towards large-scale privacy preserving data mining.
3. Proposed Algorithm: PABIDOT
PABIDOT perturbs a dataset by using multidimensional geometric transformations, reflection,
translation, and rotation followed by randomized expansion (a new noise addition mechanism which
is explained in Section 3) and random tuple shuffling. Figure 1 shows the basic flow and architecture
of the proposed perturbation algorithm. Based on the proposed privacy model called Φ− separation,
the algorithm aims at optimum privacy protection in terms of protection against data reconstruction
attacks. PABIDOT achieves this by selecting the best possible perturbation parameters based on the
properties of the input dataset. Figure 1 also demonstrates the position of PABIDOT in a privacy-
preserving big data release scenario. PABIDOT assumes that the original data can be accessed only by
the owner/ the administrator of that dataset. There can be complementary releases of the perturbed
versions of the original dataset. The original dataset will not be released to a third party users under
any circumstances.
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Perturbed Data (Dp)
Accept the dataset
(D) to be sanitized 
Retrieve standard
deviation (STDVEC)
and mean vectors
(MEANVEC) of D
Apply z-score
normalisation over D
Generate translation
matrix using uniform
random noise
Identify the best perturbation
parameters that match the
properties of D
Generate the rotation matrix
and reflection matrix using
the best perturbation
parameters
Apply reflection,
translation, and
rotation respectively
on DN 
Apply randomized
expansion 
Apply reverse z-
score normalization
using STDVEC and
MEANVEC
Randomly swap the
tuples
Release the perturbed
dataset (Dp)
PABIDOT
Data to be perturbed (D)
Administrator / Data Owner
User 3User 1 User 2 User n
Figure 1: Basic flow and the architecture of PABIDOT. In this setting, the data owner is considered to be the trusted
curator who owns the original dataset. The owner is located in the local edge of a cloud computing scenario. The orange
boxes represent the main steps of the algorithm whereas the green boxes represent the intermediate data generative steps
which support the appropriate main steps.
Rationale and technical novelty. PABIDOT applies geometric transformations with optimal per-
turbation parameters and increases randomness using randomized expansion followed by a random
tuple shuffle. It defines privacy in such a way that the resulting dataset has an optimal difference
compared to the original dataset as a result of the privacy model (Φ−separation) used by PABIDOT.
This property helps in minimizing the search space and finding the best possible perturbation for
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a particular dataset. Consequently, efficiency and reliability of PABIDOT in big data perturbation
increase while providing better resistance to data reconstruction. Figure 1 and Algorithm 3 depict the
proposed perturbation algorithm, and Table 1 provides a summary of the notations used in Algorithm
2 and Algorithm 3. As shown, the original dataset and the standard deviation to the normal random
noise provided under randomized expansion are the only inputs to Algorithm 3, and the perturbed
dataset is its only output.
Data matrix (D). The dataset to be perturbed is represented as a matrix (D) of size m× n where
the columns represent the attributes (n attributes), and rows represent the records (m records). For
example, personal information of a patient can be represented as a record which may have attributes
such as age, weight, height, and gender. The data matrix is assumed to contain numerical data only.
D =

a11 . . . a1k . . . a1n
a21 . . . a2k . . . a2n
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
am1 . . . amk . . . amn

m×n
(1)
In the process of perturbation, the data matrix is subjected to multidimensional geometric composite
transformations. During these transformations, a record (row) in the data matrix will be considered
as a point in the multi-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system.
Multidimensional isometric transformations. Geometric translation, rotation and reflection are
considered to be isometric transformations in the n-dimensional space. A transformation T : Rn → Rn
is said to be isometric, if it preserves the distances so that [30]
|T (A)− T (B)|= |A−B|, ∀ A,B ∈ Rn. (2)
All matrices and Cartesian points are represented in homogeneous coordinate form in order to
consider all the transformations in matrix multiplication form. A homogeneous coordinate point in
n-dimensional space can be written as an (n+ 1) dimensional position vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn, h) with
the additional term h 6= 0. The introduction of homogeneous coordinates enables composite transfor-
mation between the coordinates and transformation matrices without having to perform a collection of
transformations as a sequential process. Therefore, multidimensional geometric translation, reflection
and rotation can be represented in their generalized forms of (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrices [22].
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A composite operation is performed when several transformation matrices have to be applied in a
particular transformation. If several transformation matrices M1,M2,M3, . . . are sequentially applied
to a homogeneous matrix X, the composite operation is given by
X ′ = . . . (M3(M2(M1X))) = . . .M3 ×M2 ×M1 ×X (3)
Homogeneous data matrix. All records in the input data matrix (D) are converted to homogeneous
coordinates by adding a new column of ones (i.e. h = 1) after the nth column. The resulting
homogeneous representation of the data matrix is given by Equation 4.
The input dataset will first be subjected to z-score normalization [23] in order to provide equal
weights for all attributes in the transformations. Next, the n-dimensional translational matrix is
generated according to Equation 5, in which the translational coefficients are drawn from random
noise with uniform distribution, and n equals to the number of attributes in the input dataset. Due
to z-score normalization, the attribute mean becomes 0 while the standard deviation of the dataset
becomes 1. Therefore, the noise generated by the uniform random noise function is bounded within
(0, 1) and follows the inequality 0 < ti(n+ 1) < 1 where ti(n+ 1) denotes a translational coefficient.
D =

a11 . . . a1k . . . a1n 1
a21 . . . a2k . . . a2n 1
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
am1 . . . amk . . . amn 1

m×(n+1)
(4)
n-Dimensional translation matrix. The n-dimensional homogeneous translation matrix TND
can be derived as shown in Equation 5 [22].
TND =

1 0 0 . . . 0 t1(n+1)
0 1 0 . . . 0 t2(n+1)
0 0 1 . . . 0 t3(n+1)
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 t(n)(n+1)
0 0 0 . . . 0 1

(n+1)×(n+1)
(5)
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n-Dimensional reflection matrix. Next, for each of the n axes PABIDOT generates the cor-
responding matrix of reflection according to Equation 7. The n-dimensional homogeneous matrix
RFND for reflection across axis one can be derived as shown in Equation 6 [22].
RFND =

1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 −1 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 0 −1 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . −1 0 0
0 0 0 . . . 0 −1 0
0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1

(n+1)×(n+1)
(6)
The (n+1) axis reflection matrix can be written as shown in Equation 7.
RFND =

−1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 1 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 0 1 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 0 0
0 0 0 . . . 0 1 0
0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1

(n+1)×(n+1)
(7)
n-Dimensional rotation matrix. After creating the matrix of reflection for one of the n number of
axes, PABIDOT generates the n-dimensional concatenated subplane rotation matrices (M for the cur-
rent θi) using Algorithm 1 for each θi where ((0 < θi < pi), θi /∈
{
pi/6, pi/4, pi/3, pi/2, 2pi/3, 3pi/4, 5pi/6
}
)
In order to derive a single matrix that represents the entire n − dimensional orientation, the
concatenated sub-plane rotation method can be used. Then, the rotations in the plane of a pair of
coordinate axes (xˆi, xˆj) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n can be written as a block matrix as in Equation 8 [34].
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Rij(θij) =

1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . cosθij 0 . . . 0 −sinθij . . . 0
0 . . . 0 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0
0 . . . sinθij 0 . . . 0 cosθij . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 1

(n+1)×(n+1)
(8)
Thus N(N−1)2 distinct Rij(θij) should be concatenated in the preferred order to produce the final
composite n-dimensional matrix which can be obtained using Equation 9 with N(N−1)2 degrees of
freedom, parameterized by θij .
M =
∏
i<j
Rij(θij) (9)
Algorithm for generating the multidimensional concatenated sub-plane rotation matrix.
Based on Equations 8 and 9, Algorithm 1 can be used to generate the multidimensional concatenated
subplane rotational matrix of the desired rotation angle.
The resulting rotation matrix has the properties of an orthogonal matrix where the columns and
rows of the resulting concatenated subplane rotation matrix (R(θ)) are orthonormal, and hence R(θ)
preserves the relationship, R(θ)×R(θ)T = R(θ)T ×R(θ) = I where R(θ)T be the transpose matrix of
R(θ) and I be the identity matrix.
12
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for generating multidimensional concatenated subplane rotation matrix
Inputs :
n ← number of attributes of the dataset
θ ← rotation angle
Outputs:
M ← multidimensional rotation matrix of θ
1: V = {1, 2, . . . , n}
2: C = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ V and i 6= j}
3: In = identity matrix of size n
4: N =
(
n
2
)
. Total number of sin(θ) and cos(θ) assignments necessary
5: I3 = In
6: for k = 1 to N do
7: A = {(ik, ik), (jk, ik), (ik, jk), (jk, jk)} where {ik, jk}
is the kthset of C . Coordinates of sin(θ) and cos(θ) assignments for an instance of C
8: I2 = In . Initializing In with the identity matrix of size n
9: I2(ik1, jk1) = cos(θ)
where, (ik1, jk1) is the set number 1 of A
10: I2(ik2, jk2) = sin(θ)
where, (ik2, jk2) is the set number 2 of A
11: I2(ik3, jk3) = −sin(θ)
where, (ik3, jk3) is the set number 3 of A
12: I2(ik4, jk4) = cos(θ)
where, (ik4, jk4) is the set number 4 of A
13: I3 = I3× I2 . Iterative multiplication of I2 and I3 to form M according to Equations 8 and 9
14: end for
15: M = I3 . follows Equations 8 and 9
End Algorithm
Privacy metric for generating the optimal perturbation parameters. Since the proposed
method is based on multidimensional isometric transformations, it is important to use a multi-column
privacy metric for evaluating the privacy of the proposed method. Assuming that all attributes of
the dataset are equally important, z-score normalization is applied to the data matrix as the initial
step in the perturbation process. The higher the privacy of the perturbed data, the more difficult it
is to estimate the original data [10]. To extend this idea, the variance of the difference between the
perturbed and non-perturbed datasets (V ar(P )) is considered, the higher the V ar(P ), the higher the
privacy. Hence, V ar(P ) provides a measure of privacy of the perturbed data, or the level of difficulty
to estimate the original data without prior knowledge about the original data [10], which is often
called naive inference/estimation [10]. V ar(P ) has long been used to measure the level of privacy of
perturbed data [31]. In the proposed method the attribute which returns the minimum variance for
the difference is considered as the minimum privacy guarantee. If Xp is a perturbed data series of
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attribute X, the level of privacy of the perturbation method can be measured using V ar(P ), where
P = (Xp −X). Therefore, V ar(P ) can be written as in Equation 10.
V ar(P ) = V ar(p1, p2, . . . , pn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(pi − p¯)2 (10)
We propose a new privacy definition called Φ − separation as follows. Assume we have a dataset
D of m instances and each instance having n attributes. We perturb this dataset in k different ways,
producing datasets Dpj = [d
p
j1, d
p
j2, . . . , d
p
jn]m×n for j = 1, 2, . . . , k. The perturbed value of an attribute
d is denoted as dp. We then calculate the difference between the original data and the perturbed data
D - Dpj , which will contain values of (di - d
p
i ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We calculate the variance of each
attribute in D - Dpj , and select the minimum of these variances.
φj = min{[var(di − dpji)]}∀j = 1, 2, . . . , k (11)
From the k perturbations, we choose the one that has the largest value of Φ, i.e. we choose
the perturbation that produced the most significant difference between the original dataset and the
perturbed dataset.
Definition 3.1 (Φ − separation). Given the dataset D = [d1, d2, . . . , dn]m×n and a perturbation
algorithm, we shall denote a perturbed instance of D as Dpj = [d
p
j1, d
p
j2, . . . , d
p
jn]m×n for j = 1, 2, . . . , k,
where k represents the number of possible ways of perturbing D. Then, the minimum privacy guarantee
φj is defined as
φj = min{[var(di − dpji)]}∀j = 1, 2, . . . , k (12)
and the optimal privacy guarantee Φ is
Φ = max{φj}kj=1 (13)
A perturbed dataset that has the optimal privacy guarantee provides Φ− separation.
For a perturbed data matrix Dp of D of size m × n, the minimum privacy guarantee (φ) is
the minimum of the variances calculated for attributes based on the differences between the original
and perturbed z-score normalized values, as shown in Equation 14. Here φ is the minimum privacy
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guarantee and n is the total number of attributes in D or Dp.
φ = min(V ar(dij − dpij)mi=1)nj=1 ∀dij ∈ D, dpij ∈ Dp (14)
Identifying the best perturbation parameters for DN . In each iteration the algorithm maximizes
the value of φ to generate Φ as given in Equation 17. With the axis of reflection varying from 1 to n
(number of attributes) and the angle of rotation (θ) varying from 0 to 179 degrees, i.e. 0 < θ < pi and
θ /∈ {pi/6, pi/4, pi/3, pi/2, 2pi/3, 3pi/4, 5pi/6}, the perturbation will return a n × θ number of perturbed
data matrices: Dp1,1, D
p
1,2, . . . , D
p
1,179, D
p
2,1, D
p
2,2, . . . , D
p
2,179, . . . , D
p
n,1,
Dpn,2, . . . , D
p
n,179 with different levels of perturbations. This will form the matrix of local minimum
privacy guarantees, φi,j as given in Equation 15.

φ1,1 φ1,2 . . . φ1,179
φ2,1 φ2,2 . . . φ2,179
...
...
. . .
...
φn,1 φn,2 . . . φn,179

n×179
(15)
To get the global minimum guarantee (φj)values for each angle, we get the minimum of each column
as given in Equation 16. [
φ1 φ2 . . . φ179
]
(16)
The perturbed data matrix with the optimal privacy can be considered as the data matrix that
returns the largest value Φ for the minimum privacy guarantee φ. Therefore, the largest global mini-
mum privacy guarantee (φj) is selected from Equation 16 to obtain Φ (Equation 17). In other words,
the best perturbation parameters will be selected using the highest privacy guarantee Φ, based on the
most vulnerable attributes.
Φ = max([[φj ]
179
j=1]) (17)
Generate the rotation matrix and reflection matrix using the best perturbation parameters
for DN . Next, PABIDOT records the angle of rotation (θoptimal) and axis of reflection (Rifoptimal) at
Φ. Now, the algorithm uses Rifoptimal to generate the matrix of reflection according to Equation 7 and
use θoptimal to generate the matrix of rotation according to Algorithm 1. Composite transformation
of reflection, translation, and rotation will then be applied to the z-score normalized matrix using the
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matrices of optimal reflection, translation, and optimal rotation to generate Dp2.
Application of z-score normalization and the transformations: reflection, translation
and rotation. After generating the concatenated subplane rotation matrix, PABIDOT applies the
composite transformation of reflection, translation, and rotation on the z-score normalized input data
matrix. Rotation is applied after reflection and noise translation. This is because the effect of rotation
is proportional to the distance from the origin, and we want to reduce the probability of points close
to the origin getting attacked due to weaker perturbation [11]. An instance of the application of
the transformation to the input data matrix (D) in the order of application can be represented using
Equation 18.
D
′
= (M × TND ×RFND × (DN )T )T (18)
Randomized Expansion. A privacy preserving algorithm is composable if it can keep satisfying
the same privacy requirements of the privacy model in use, after repeated independent application of
the algorithm [38]. To improve the composability and the randomness of the perturbation algorithm,
noise drawn from random normal distribution (with a mean of 0, and a predefined standard deviation
subjected to a default value of 0.3) is added to the data according to a novel approach named as
randomized expansion. Here, we introduce noise in such a way that it further enhances the positiveness
or the negativeness of a particular value where the zeros are not subjected to any change as depicted
in Figure 2.
0
1 2 3 4 5 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 
positive shiftnegative shift
zero shift 
Figure 2: Effect of Randomized Expansion. The red arrows of the right-hand side show a positive shift where a
calibrated positive random value is added to the positive value to increase the positiveness of the original value. The
left-hand side which is represented by the blue arrows show a negative shift where a calibrated negative random value
is added to the negative value to increase the negativeness of the original value.
In order to generate the noise for randomized expansion, first, we generate the sign matrix (S±)
based on the values of Dp2. A value in S± will be 1 if the corresponding element of Dp2 is greater
than 0, it will be 0 if the corresponding element of Dp2 equals 0, and it will be -1 if the corresponding
element of Dp2 is less than 0. Dp2./abs(Dp2) if Dp2 is complex. Next, the absolute values of Dp2 and
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absolute values of the random normal noise matrix (N (0, σ)) are added together and dot product with
S± is calculated as denoted in Equation 19.
Dp2 = (
∥∥∥Dp2∥∥∥+ ∥∥N (0, σ)∥∥) • S± (19)
Application of reverse z-score normalization and random tuple swapping. At this stage, the
attributes of the perturbed data matrix will not be within the ranges of the attributes of the original
dataset. Therefore, reverse z-score normalization will be applied to the current matrix, using the
standard deviations (STDV EC) and means of the attributes (MEANV EC) of the original dataset.
Finally, the tuples of the resulting matrix will be randomly swapped to generate the final perturbed
dataset.
Table 1: Summary of the notations used in the proposed algorithm.
Notation Summary/Constraints
Φ Φ is the optimal privacy guarantee
θoptimal θi at Φ
Rifoptimal optimal axis for (n− 1) reflection selected at Φ
m number of tuples
n number of attributes
DN z-score normalized dataset of D
Cov(DN ) covariance matrix of DN
TNnoise transformation matrix with uniform random noise
RFax n-dimensional reflection matrix for the current axis ax
(generated according to Equation 7)
θi ( 0 < θi < pi) and θi /∈
{
pi/6, pi/4, pi/3, pi/2, 2pi/3, 3pi/4, 5pi/6
}
Mi n-dimensional concatenated subplane rotation matrix
generated using Algorithm 1 for θi
Mθ n-dimensional concatenate sub-plane rotation matrix
generated using Algorithm 1 for θoptimal
RFoptimal RFoptimal is the n-dimensional reflection matrix,
generated according to Equation 7 for Rifoptimal
STDV EC vector of standard deviations of all the attributes of D
MEANV EC vector of mean values of all the attributes of D
3.1. Overall process of PABIDOT
Algorithm 2 summarizes the overall set of steps of the basic perturbation algorithm. A summary
of notations used in this algorithm is provided in Table 1. For convenience, we refer to Algorithm 2
as PABIDOT basic in subsequent sections.
17
Algorithm 2 Basic steps of PABIDOT
Inputs :
D ← original dataset
σ ← input noise standard deviation (default value=0.3)
Outputs:
Dp ← perturbed dataset
1: Φ = 0
2: θoptimal = 0
3: Rifoptimal = 0
4: generate DN . by applying z-score normalization on D
5: generate TNnoise . according to Equation 5, using uniform random noise as the translational coefficients
6: for each ax in {1, 2, . . . , n} do . assume there are n number of attributes in D
7: generate RFax . according to Equation 7
8: for each θi do
9: generate Mi using Algorithm 1 . refer Equations 8, and 9
10: Dp1 = (Mi × TNnoise ×RFax × (DN )T )T . follows Equation 18
11: φi,ax = min(V ar(xij − pij)mi=1)nj=1 ∀ xij ∈ DN and pij ∈ Dp1 . according to Equation 14
12: end for
13: end for
14: for each θi do
15: φi = min(φi,ax) where, ax ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} . follows Equation 16
16: end for
17: Φ = max(φi) where, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , θ} . according to Equation 17
18: θoptimal = θi at Φ
19: Rifoptimal = ax at Φ
20: generate Mθ . according to Algorithm 1, using θoptimal
21: generate RFoptimal . according to Equation 7, using Rifoptimal
22: Dp2 = (Mθ × TNnoise ×RFoptimal × (DN )T )T . follows Equation 18
23: Dp2 = (
∥∥∥Dp2∥∥∥ + ∥∥N (0, σ)∥∥)•S± . according to Equation 19
24: Dp= Dp3 • STDV EC+MEANV EC . reverse z-score normalization
25: randomly swap the tuples of Dp
End Algorithm
4. Optimizing the efficiency of PABIDOT
During the execution of PABIDOT, the composite transformations in steps 10 and 11 in Algorithm
2 need to be applied to the whole dataset for a total of n × θ times. This can be infeasible for high
dimensional datasets. To accelerate the computations, a method based on the covariance matrix of
the input dataset (D) was used to generate φi,ax, where φi,ax = min(
#»
1 + diag(RT ×RF ×Cov(D)×
RF × RTT ) + sum((Cov(D) × RF • RT )T )T ). This eliminates the necessity of searching through a
large number of tuples of a big dataset in each loop to find Φ, as it only needs the Cov(D) of D. The
steps of this derivation are provided below (Section 4).
18
Poof:
V ar(X −Xp) = E(X −Xp)2 − [E(X −Xp)]2
= E(X2 − 2XXp −Xp2)− [(E(X))2 − 2E(X)E(Xp) + (E(Xp))2]
= [E(X2)− (E(X))2] + [E(Xp2)− (E(Xp))2]− 2[E(XXp)− E(X)E(Xp)]
= V ar(X) + V ar(Xp)− 2Cov(X,Xp)
(20)
Since, X is z-score normalized V ar(X) is equal to (n−1)/n. For large number of records (n−1)/n = 1.
Therefore,
V ar(X −Xp) = 1 + V ar(Xp)− 2× Cov(X,Xp) (21)
Hence,
V ar(D −Dp) = #»1 + V ar(Dp)− 2× Cov(D,Dp) (22)
Let’s consider the following table D as the table to be perturbed where X,Y, Z are the columns
of D,
X Y Z
a1 => x1 y1 z1
a2 => x2 y2 z2
a3 => x3 y3 z3
The perturbation of a single tuple ai can be given as a
p
i = RT × TN ×RF × aTi (where, RT ,TN
and RF are rotation, translation and reflection matrices respectively), which is found using

xp1
yp1
zp1
1

=

a b c 0
d e f 0
g h i 0
0 0 0 1


1 0 0 nx
0 1 0 ny
0 0 1 nz
0 0 0 1


−1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


x1
y1
z1
1

(23)
Assuming that axis 1 has been selected for the (n− 1) reflection.
Therefore,
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xp1 = −a(x1 + nx) + b(y1 + ny) + c(z1 + nz) = −ax1 + by1 + cz1 + anx + bny + cnz
xp2 = −a(x2 + nx) + b(y2 + ny) + c(z2 + nz) = −ax2 + by2 + cz2 + anx + bny + cnz
xp3 = −a(x3 + nx) + b(y3 + ny) + c(z3 + nz) = −ax3 + by3 + cz3 + anx + bny + cnz
(24)
and

xp1
xp2
...
xpn

= −a

x1
x2
...
xn

+ b

y1
y2
...
yn

+ c

z1
z2
...
zn

+ aNx + bNy + cNz
or
Xp = −aX + bY + cZ + δE (25)
Where, δE = aNx + bNy + cNz
So,
Cov(X,Xp) = Cov(X, (−aX + bY + cZ + δE))
= Cov(X,−aX) + Cov(X, bY ) + Cov(X, cZ)
= −aCov(X,X) + bCov(X,Y ) + cCov(X,Y )
(26)
Similarly,
Cov(Y, Y p) = −dCov(Y,X) + eCov(Y, Y ) + fCov(X,Z) (27)
Cov(Z,Zp) = −gCov(Z,X) + hCov(Z, Y ) + iCov(Z,Z) (28)
and
Cov(D,Dp) =

−aCov(X,X) + bCov(X,Y ) + cCov(X,Z)
−dCov(Y,X) + eCov(Y, Y ) + fCov(Y,Z)
−gCov(Z,X) + hCov(Z, Y ) + iCov(Z,Z)
 (29)
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Therefore,
Cov(D,Dp) = sum



Cov(X,X) Cov(X,Y ) Cov(X,Z) 0
Cov(Y,X) Cov(Y, Y ) Cov(Y,Z) 0
Cov(Z,X) Cov(Z, Y ) Cov(Z,Z) 0
0 0 0 1

×

−1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

•

a b c 0
d e f 0
g h i 0
0 0 0 1


T

T
(30)
or
Cov(D,Dp) = sum((Cov(D)×RF •RT )T )T (31)
Let A be the dataset of attributes (A1, A2, A3, . . . , An), and let V be the variance-covariance of
a size n× n square matrix defined by,
Vi,j = Cov(Ai, Aj) (32)
where the diagonal elements are Vi,i = V ar(Ai)
Let r be a row vector of weight factors (in this case n elements). Then
V ar(rX) = rV r
′
(33)
written out in component form,
V ar(r1A1 + r2A2 + r3A3 + · · ·+ riAi) = riCov(Ai, Aj)rj (34)
Since, Cov(Ai, Aj) = Cov(Ai, Aj) and Cov(Ai, Ai) = V ar(Ai)
riCov(Ai, Aj)rj = ∀i = j : r2i V ar(Ai) + ∀i < j : 2rirjCov(Ai, Aj) (35)
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Hence,
V ar(aX + bY + cZ) = a2V ar(X) + b2V ar(Y ) + c2V ar(Z)+
2abCov(X,Y ) + 2acCov(X,Z) + 2bcCov(Y, Z) (36)
Therefore,
V ar(−aX + bY + cZ + δE) = a2V ar(X) + b2V ar(Y ) + c2V ar(Z)− 2abCov(X,Y )−
2acCov(X,Z) + 2bcCov(Y, Z) (37)
Hence,
V ar(Xp) = a2V ar(X) + b2V ar(Y ) + c2V ar(Z)−
2abCov(X,Y )− 2acCov(X,Z) + 2bcCov(Y,Z) (38)
Similarly,
V ar(Y p) = d2V ar(X) + e2V ar(Y ) + f2V ar(Z) − 2deCov(X,Y ) − 2dfCov(X,Z) + 2efCov(Y, Z)
V ar(Zp) = g2V ar(X) + h2V ar(Y ) + i2V ar(Z)− 2ghCov(X,Y )− 2giCov(X,Z) + 2ihCov(Y,Z)
Hence,
V ar(D) = diag


a b c 0
d e f 0
g h i 0
0 0 0 1

×

−1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

×

Cov(X,X) Cov(X,Y ) Cov(X,Z) 0
Cov(Y,X) Cov(Y, Y ) Cov(Y, Z) 0
Cov(Z,X) Cov(Z, Y ) Cov(Z,Z) 0
0 0 0 1

×

−1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

×

a d g 0
b e h 0
c f i 0
0 0 0 1


(39)
V ar(Dp) = diag(RT ×RF × Cov(D)×RF ×RTT ) (40)
From Equations 31 and 40 we can write,
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V ar(D −Dp) = #»1 + diag(RT ×RF × Cov(D)×RF ×RTT ) + sum((Cov(D)×RF •RT )T )T (41)
Where,
#»
1 is a column vector of 1s of size n, which is the number of attributes of D.
Since, φ = min(V ar(D −Dp)),
φ = min(
#»
1 + diag(RT × RF × Cov(D) × RF × RTT ) + sum((Cov(D) × RF • RT )T )T ) (42)

Now we can remove the two computationally intensive steps: Dp1 = (Mi × TNnoise × RFax ×
(DN )T )T and φi,ax = min(V ar(xij−pij)mi=1)nj=1 ∀ xij ∈ DN with φi,ax = min(
#»
1 +diag(Mi×RFax×
CDN ×RFax ×MTi ) + sum((CDN ×RFax •Mi)T )T ).
4.1. Steps of PABIDOT after efficiency optimization
Algorithm 3 shows the set of steps of the efficiency-optimized version of PABIDOT. In subsequent
sections of the paper, PABIDOT (Algorithm 3) refers to the optimized version of PABIDOT basic
(Algorithm 2).
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Algorithm 3 PABIDOT with efficiency optimization
Inputs :
D ← original dataset
σ ← input noise standard deviation (default value=0.3)
Outputs:
Dp ← perturbed dataset
1: Φ = 0
2: θoptimal = 0
3: Rifoptimal = 0
4: generate DN
5: generate Cov(DN )
6: generate TNnoise
7: for each ax in {1, 2, . . . , n} do
8: generate RFax
9: for each θi do
10: generate Mi using Algorithm 1
11: φi,ax = min(
#»
1 + diag(Mi×RFax×Cov(DN )×RFax×MTi ) + sum((Cov(DN )×RFax •Mi)T )T )
12: end for
13: end for
14: for each θi do
15: φi = min(φi,ax) where, ax ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
16: end for
17: Φ = max(φi) where, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , θ}
18: θoptimal = θi at Φ
19: Rifoptimal = ax at Φ
20: generate Mθ
21: generate RFoptimal
22: Dpt = (Mθ × TNnoise ×RFoptimal × (DN )T )T
23: Dpt = (
∥∥Dpt∥∥ + ∥∥N (0, σ)∥∥)•S±
24: Dp= Dpt • STDV EC+MEANV EC
25: randomly swap the tuples of Dp
End Algorithm
With the new derivation for φ, the time consumption of PABIDOT drastically reduces. This can
be observed in Figures 4a and 4b through the red colored plots. As shown, the efficiency optimization
of PABIDOT (Algorithm 3) introduces a considerable efficiency improvement over PABIDOT basic
(Algorithm 2). When the time consumption of PABIDOT and PABIDOT basic are plotted in the
same diagram (Figure 4a), PABIDOT shows an almost constant trend. This is because of the increase
in time consumption by PABIDOT after efficiency optimization is considerably lower than that of
PABIDOT basic. However, the time consumption of PABIDOT is not constant, as shown in Figure
3a. Table 3 shows the massive improvement of efficiency of PABIDOT after its efficiency optimization.
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5. Experiments, Results, and Analysis
This section provides information about the experimental setup, the results, and the analysis of
the experimental results of PABIDOT’s performance tests. The default input value of σ = 0.3 is
considered for the experiments unless specified otherwise.
5.1. Experimental Setup
Computation. All the experiments except those on scalability and empirical privacy guarantee were
tested on a Windows 7 (Enterprise 64-bit, Build 7601) computer with an Intel(R) i7-4790 (4th genera-
tion) CPU (8 cores, 3.60 GHz) and 8GB RAM. The scalability and the empirical privacy guarantee of
the proposed algorithm were tested using a Linux (SUSE Enterprise Server 11 SP4) SGI UV3000 su-
percomputer, with 64 Intel Haswell 10-core processors, 25MB cache and 8TB of global shared memory
connected by SGI’s NUMAlink interconnect.
Datasets. The datasets used for performance testing have different dimensions, i.e. varying from
small to large, and contain only numerical attributes apart from the class attribute. We removed the
attributes that directly reflect the distribution of the class attribute to avoid classification accuracy
bias. A short description of the nine datasets used for testing is given in Table 2. Our dataset selection
procedure was focused on selecting the datasets from a diverse range of domains (e.g. monetary data,
wine quality data, document layout data, image features, binarized regression data, electricity data,
space shuttle data (NASA), exotic particle data, and signal process data) covering a diverse range of
dimensions (e.g. 440×8, 4898×12, 5473×11, 20000×17, 40768×11, 45312×9, 58000×9, 3310816×28,
and 11000000×28). The selection of the datasets over other similar datasets was random and unbiased.
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Table 2: Short descriptions of the datasets selected for testing. We retrieved the datasets from the UCI ML data
repository (https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/) and the OpenML data repository (https://www.openml.org/d/).
The selected datasets’ sizes range from small to extremely large, to allow the investigation of PABIDOT’s performance
on varying dimensions of data.
Dataset Abbreviation Number of Records Number of Attributes Number of Classes
Wholesale customers3 WCDS 440 8 2
Wine Quality4 WQDS 4898 12 7
Page Blocks Classification 5 PBDS 5473 11 5
Letter Recognition6 LRDS 20000 17 26
Fried7 FRDS 40768 11 2
Electricity8 ELDS 45312 9 2
Statlog (Shuttle)9 SSDS 58000 9 7
HEPMASS10 HPDS 3310816 28 2
HIGGS11 HIDS 11000000 28 2
Classification algorithms. Data classification tests were carried out by using Weka 3.6, [47] a
collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks. As different classes of classification
algorithms employ different classification strategies; we used five classification algorithms for testing
the accuracy of the proposed method: Multilayer perceptron (MLP), k-nearest neighbor (kNN), Se-
quential Minimal Optimization (SMO), Naive Bayes, and J48 [47]. MLP is a classifier that uses
back-propagation to classify instances, kNN is a non-parametric method used for classification [47].
SMO is an implementation of John Platt’s sequential minimal optimization algorithm for training a
support vector classifier. Naive Bayes is a fast classification algorithm based on probabilistic classifiers.
J48 is an implementation of the decision tree classification algorithm [47].
5.2. Performance Evaluation
Performance evaluation focuses on the utility which can be defined as the usability or the effec-
tiveness of a perturbation method and its underlying data. We investigated the utility of PABIDOT
in terms of classification accuracy. However, PABIDOT must prove its usability based on time com-
plexity, memory overhead, scalability and biases, which formed the foundations to our evaluation. We
compared the results of PABIDOT with the results obtained from random rotation perturbation (RP)
[10] and geometric perturbation (GP) [11] as they are the closest methods to PABIDOT.
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Wholesale+customers
4https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Wine+Quality
5https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Page+Blocks+Classification
6https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Letter+Recognition
7https://www.openml.org/d/901
8https://www.openml.org/d/151
9https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Statlog+%28Shuttle%29
10https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/HEPMASS#
11https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/HIGGS#
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The original datasets were perturbed using RP, GP, and PABIDOT, and the classification accuracy
generated by the perturbed data of the three methods were compared. The comparisons were made
using a nonparametric statistical comparison test: Friedman’s rank test, which is analogous to a
standard one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance [20]. Friedman’s mean ranks (FMR) and
the statistical significance of the results were recorded. We tested the time complexity of PABIDOT
via theoretical and runtime measurements. The scalability of PABIDOT was tested by running the
algorithm on the SGI UV3000 supercomputer over the large-scale datasets, HPDS and HIDS then
comparing the runtime results to that of RP and GP. Finally, the memory requirements of the three
methods were investigated by looking at peak memory usage; for that, MATLAB’s memory profiler
tool [32] was used.
5.2.1. Time Complexity
Algorithm 3 has two loops that are controlled by the number of attributes in the dataset and by
the rotation angle range. Since the bounds of the rotation angle are fixed, the internal loop is repeated
a constant number of times, and we denote this constant as k. For a dataset of n number of attributes
and m number of tuples, the outer loop iterates for n number of times. The estimated time complexity
of the loops is then O(k × n) = O(n). By taking into consideration that step 11 is O(n3), loop block
(from step 7 to 13) has a complexity of O(n4). It can be identified that the most computationally
complex step out of the remaining steps is step 22, which has a complexity of O(n3 ×m). Therefore,
we can conclude that the worst case complexity of PABIDOT is governed by O(n3×m) as m >>> n.
Effect of the number of instances(tuples) and the number of attributes on the perturbation
time taken by PABIDOT. We used the HPDS dataset to obtain a clear idea about the trends
in time consumption of PABIDOT. The dataset was trimmed (t HPDS) to have the dimensions of
240550×28 which is large enough to provide a significant trend while keeping the execution time
within reasonable bounds. Figure 3a shows the time consumption of PABIDOT for increasing number
of instances while the number of attributes is constant. Figure 3b shows the time consumption of
PABIDOT for an increasing number of attributes while the number of instances is constant. In Figure
4 the same two plots were drawn together with the corresponding times before efficiency optimization
(i.e. PABIDOT and PABIDOT basic together).
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Figure 3: Time consumption of PABIDOT. PABIDOT shows linear time complexity for the number of instances, and
exponential time complexity for the number of attributes. However, the time consumption is very low in all cases.
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Figure 4: Time Consumption of PABIDOT before and after the efficiency optimization. Both PABIDOT and
PABIDOT basic show similar trends in time consumption in the respective categories; however, PABIDOT is faster.
Effect of the number of instances and the number of attributes on perturbation time:
comparison of RP, GP, and PABIDOT. t HPDS was too large for RP and GP, therefore, LRDS
was used to test and compare the time consumption of the three methods with increasing number of
instances and increasing number of attributes respectively. In Figure 5 it can be noticed that the time
consumption of PABIDOT is extremely low compared to RP and GP.
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Figure 5: Time consumption comparison of the three methods. Due to the extremely low time consumption of PABIDOT,
its curve lies almost on the x-axis when drawn in a plot together with the others. The plots further show that the increase
in the number of instances and the increase in the number of attributes have a very small impact on PABIDOT’s time
consumption, compared to RP and GP.
5.2.2. Scalability
We conducted the scalability analysis on the SGI UV3000 supercomputer. The results are pro-
vided in Table 3. The results for both before (PABIDOT basic) and after efficiency optimization
of PABIDOT are provided along with the results of RP and GP. The plots compare the efficiency of
PABIDOT compared to RP and GP. The plots also show the efficiency improvement of PABIDOT as
a result of optimization.
Table 3: Scalability of the three algorithms for the high dimensional data. We ran the corresponding runtime experiments
on the SGI UV3000 supercomputer. The scripts were set to a time limit of 100 hours, but RP and GP couldn’t finish
the perturbation process for either of datasets even with this generous time limit.
Dataset Dimensions RP GP PABIDOT basic PABIDOT
HPDS 3310816×28 Not converged Not converged 2.9 hours 71.41 seconds
for 100 hours for 100 hours
HIDS 11000000×28 Not converged Not converged 11.16 hours 100.45 seconds
for 100 hours for 100 hours
5.2.3. Memory Overhead
The peak memory consumptions of the three methods for the first seven datasets (available in
Table 2) are provided in Table 4. The relevant Friedman test ranks are provided in the last row of the
table. The experiment returned the test statistics of a χ2 value of 3.7143, a degree of freedom of 2 and
a p-value of 0.1561. The p-value says that the memory consumptions of the three methods have more
or less a similar pattern. However, FMR values suggest that PABIDOT consumes the lowest amount
of memory among the three methods.
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Table 4: Peak memory (Kb) consumption data of the three methods for the first seven datasets in Table 2. The peak
memory consumptions recorded the highest memory usage of the corresponding methods at a particular instance in
kilobytes. We used Matlab memory profiler to track the peak memory consumption during the perturbation of each
dataset.
Dataset RP GP PABIDOT
LRDS 2564 3084 2664
PBDS 1540 2056 428
SSDS 3072 3180 3408
WCDS 512 1024 444
WQDS 512 5846 184
FRDS 4756 3853 3865
ELDS 4945 6312 3449
FMR 1.86 2.57 1.57
5.2.4. Classification Accuracy
Table 5 has the classification accuracy results of the original dataset and the datasets perturbed
by RP, GP, and PABIDOT. 10-fold cross-validation was used to validate the classification models. An
instance of the model validation for a perturbed dataset is presented in Figure 6. As shown in Figure
6, for the case of perturbed data (RP, GP, and PABIDOT), both classification model training and
testing are done using the same perturbed dataset.
Test
Iterate 10 times
Split 
to 
10 Samples 
Perturbed 
Dataset 
Classification Algorithm
Predictions
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
Train
9 Data Samples 
 
1 Data Sample 
(Select the nth sample for the nth iteration) 
 
 
10 Samples 
Evaluate
 
 
 
 
 
Classification 
Accuracy 
Figure 6: The process used to generate the classification models trained by the perturbed data. This figure represents
the overall process of 10-fold cross-validation used in our experiments. We validated the classification models for each
of the perturbed datasets. Ten samples were taken from each particular perturbed dataset, and the validation ran for
ten iterations. In a single iteration, nine samples out of 10 were used for training, and 1 sample for testing. Finally, the
average classification accuracy of the ten cycles was returned as the final accuracy for a particular dataset.
The percentage values in Table 5 are the average accuracy values returned for the first seven datasets
shown in Table 2. The classification accuracy results were compared using Friedman’s rank test. The
last row of Table 5 has Friedman’s ranks for the classification accuracies of the three methods. The
test statistics of the experiment had a χ2 value of 24.7914, a degree of freedom of 2 and a p-value of
4.1364e-06. Figure 7 shows the box plots for the datasets listed in Table 5.
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Table 5: Classification accuracies returned by the original dataset and the three methods. The last row shows the
Friedman’s mean ranks (FMRs) of the classification accuracy data which correspond to each of the methods (RP, GP,
and PABIDOT). A higher rank indicates that the corresponding method tends to provide higher classification accuracy.
Consequently, PABIDOT is likely to return higher accuracies compared to RP and GP.
Dataset Algorithm MLP IBK SVM Naive Bayes J48
LRDS Original 82.20% 95.96% 82.44% 64.01% 87.92%
RP 74.04% 87.19% 71.07% 48.41% 64.89%
GP 79.12% 93.05% 77.92% 59.89% 70.54%
PABIDOT 78.22% 92.24% 78.48% 62.80% 72.62%
PBDS Original 96.25% 96.02% 92.93% 90.85% 96.88%
RP 92.00% 95.52% 89.99% 35.76% 95.61%
GP 90.24% 95.67% 89.93% 43.10% 95.49%
PABIDOT 95.83% 94.76% 92.09% 89.68% 94.92%
SSDS Original 99.72% 99.94% 96.83% 91.84% 99.96%
RP 96.26% 99.80% 88.21% 69.04% 99.51%
GP 98.73% 99.81% 78.41% 79.18% 99.59%
PABIDOT 98.65% 98.67% 92.80% 91.34% 98.74%
WCDS Original 90.91% 87.95% 87.73% 89.09% 90.23%
RP 89.09% 85.00% 82.27% 84.55% 86.82%
GP 91.82% 86.59% 85.00% 84.32% 88.86%
PABIDOT 90.45% 85.45% 88.41% 88.86% 88.41%
WQDS Original 54.94% 64.54% 52.14% 44.67% 59.82%
RP 47.65% 53.29% 44.88% 32.32% 45.53%
GP 48.86% 56.88% 44.88% 32.16% 46.43%
PABIDOT 54.12% 61.82% 51.47% 46.57% 49.16%
FRDS Original 91.99% 82.46% 83.89% 86.53% 89.41%
RP 64.62% 56.03% 64.71% 64.59% 62.53%
GP 71.14% 61.92% 71.16% 71.08% 67.25%
PABIDOT 89.09% 80.45% 83.41% 85.53% 86.65%
ELDS Original 64.63% 79.53% 75.34% 72.98% 91.11%
RP 59.18% 54.18% 59.65% 58.14% 60.50%
GP 59.36% 53.99% 57.54% 57.65% 59.60%
PABIDOT 75.77% 73.39% 74.73% 70.10% 76.03%
FMR Values RP: 1.41 GP: 1.98 PABIDOT: 2.60
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Figure 7: Box plots for the datasets listed in Table 5. The boxplots in the figure show how each perturbation algorithm
performs on different classification algorithms. The box plots belonging to PABIDOT show higher medians, 25th
percentiles, and 75th percentiles compared to RP and GP suggesting that PABIDOT produces better utility in terms of
classification accuracy compared to RP and GP.
5.2.5. Biases and post-processing properties
Perturbation and randomization have a noticeable impact on the summary statistics such as mean
and standard deviations. Therefore, PABIDOT can be considered to have Type A biases. We ran
a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test between the tuples of the original and perturbed datasets
to check whether the perturbation has made an impact on the relationship between the confidential
attributes. The test was carried out at 5% significance level. Table 6 includes the number of tuples
that accepted the null hypothesis indicating that the perturbed and non-perturbed tuples have the
same continuous distribution.
Table 6: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the tuple comparison of the perturbed and non-perturbed datasets.
We ran two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on each of the associated (original↔perturbed) records of the original data
and the data perturbed by PABIDOT. “Total” shows the number of records that returned a test value of “0” which
indicates that two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level,
meaning that the corresponding records are similar. “Percentage” shows the percentage of the total number of similar
tuples compared to the total number of records in each dataset. According to the percentages, it is clear that PABIDOT
maintains the record integrity of the perturbed data.
Dataset LRDS PBDS SSDS WCDS WQDS FRDS ELDS
Total 16090 1928 37629 434 4897 38222 43034
Percentage 80.45% 35.23% 86.50% 98.64% 99.98% 93.75% 94.97%
From Table 6, it is evident that the new perturbation algorithm suffers a low level of Type B
biases. The results under Type B bias can be extended to conclude that the perturbation suffers only
a mild level of Type C biases, assuming that the perturbation process is conducted on both confidential
and non-confidential attributes. Next, a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was run between the
32
attributes (perturbed vs. non-perturbed) of the datasets. The test was carried out at 5% significance
level. The null hypothesis was rejected with a probability of 100% in almost all the cases proving
that the perturbation process makes changes in the attribute distributions, which in turn proves that
PABIDOT introduces Type D bias to the dataset.
5.3. Privacy Analysis
The risk of disclosure by a perturbation algorithm can be measured by quantifying the underlying
privacy. Three privacy aspects of PABIDOT were analyzed: attack resistance, privacy guarantee, and
the increase in information entropy. PABIDOT was tested for known I/O attacks, and ICA-based
attacks that are based on data reconstruction. PABIDOT’s attack resistance results were compared
with RP and GP using Friedman’s rank test, and the results were presented with the corresponding
test statistics. Further, attack resistance was analyzed employing induction using its characteristic
properties of perturbation and the properties of the attacks such as complementary release attacks
(Table 9). PABIDOT perturbs a dataset at the best perturbation parameters to achieve Φ−separation
privacy. This feature of PABIDOT was proven by testing the dynamics of Φ against data reconstruction
attacks as summarized in Figure 9.
Increase in entropy is a useful metric to measure the impurity of a dataset [35]. Since, a large
entropy value implies the availability of a large number of different records, the increase of entropy can
be a good measurement to define the difficulty of data reconstruction [35]. Therefore, the perturbed
data were tested for their impurity using the increase of entropy to establish a further estimation of
the level of privacy provided by PABIDOT.
5.3.1. Attack Resistance
The literature shows different attack types that are probable against matrix multiplicative data
perturbation. The primary purpose of these attacks is to restore the original data from the perturbed
data. Known I/O attacks [33], known sample attacks [33] and ICA (Independent Component Analysis)
[33] based attacks are three well-known attack types targeting matrix multiplicative data perturbation.
Since PABIDOT is based on matrix multiplication, it was initially tested against two typical attacks,
namely known as I/O and ICA based attacks, and resistance to further attack methods are under
consideration. As the privacy metric used in the new method optimizes the level of privacy provided
by the perturbation against naive estimation, the final perturbed dataset guarantees that it provides
enough resistance to naive estimation.
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Known I/O and ICA-based attacks. To check the resistance of the proposed algorithm to ICA
based attacks, the procedure described in [10] was employed, and the FastICA package [17] was used
to evaluate the effectiveness of ICA-based reconstruction of the perturbed data. The attack resistance
experiment was inspired by the experiments described in [10, 11], and the results are presented in
Table 7. These values were obtained as standard deviation of the difference between the normalized
original data and the perturbed data (NI) and reconstructed data (reconstructed using ICA and IO).
Our assumption was that 10% of the original data is known to the adversary in the known I/O attack
investigation. The results returned by RP and GP were generated using 10 number of iterations with
a noise factor (sigma) of 0.3 (the default settings). The subscripts “avg” and “min” in the title row
represent the minimum and average values of the corresponding data. The “min” values under each
test indicate the minimum guarantee of resistance, while “avg” values give an impression of the overall
resistance.
Table 7: Attack resistance of the algorithms. The columns NI, ICA, IO represent naive inference, independent component
analysis, and known input/output attacks respectively. NI examines the difference between the original and perturbed
data. ICA and IO attacks were run on each perturbed dataset to reconstruct datasets. In ICA and IO, the difference
between the original and the reconstructed data was considered. min and avg represent the minimum and average of
the standard deviation values of the difference between original and reconstructed data respectively. A higher value
represents a higher difference, implying higher resistance. Friedman’s mean rank (FMR) of PABIDOT indicates that it
provides higher resistance compared to RP and GP.
Dataset Algorithm NImin NIavg ICAmin ICAavg IOmin IOavg
LRDS RP 0.8750 1.4490 0.4057 0.6942 0.0945 0.2932
GP 1.3248 1.6175 0.6402 0.7122 0.0584 0.4314
PABIDOT 1.4046 1.4146 0.7038 0.7074 0.6982 0.7067
PBDS RP 0.7261 1.3368 0.5560 0.6769 0.0001 0.1242
GP 0.2845 1.4885 0.1525 0.6834 0.0000 0.1048
PABIDOT 1.4102 1.4166 0.6951 0.7042 0.6755 0.7032
SSDS RP 1.2820 1.5015 0.1751 0.5909 0.0021 0.0242
GP 1.4490 1.6285 0.0062 0.3240 0.0011 0.0111
PABIDOT 1.4058 1.4129 0.7069 0.7078 0.7031 0.7064
WCDS RP 1.0105 1.3098 0.6315 0.7362 0.0000 0.0895
GP 1.4620 1.7489 0.1069 0.6052 0.0000 0.1003
PABIDOT 1.3680 1.4260 0.6771 0.7051 0.6512 0.6809
WQDS RP 1.2014 1.4957 0.4880 0.7062 0.0057 0.4809
GP 1.3463 1.6097 0.3630 0.6536 0.0039 0.4025
PABIDOT 1.4019 1.4162 0.7034 0.7070 0.6901 0.7071
FRDS RP 1.2512 1.4318 0.6642 0.7129 0.3801 0.5270
GP 1.4407 1.5675 0.6223 0.6965 0.3799 0.5475
PABIDOT 1.4057 1.4155 0.7051 0.7067 0.7019 0.7055
ELDS RP 1.0471 1.4001 0.6701 0.7282 0.0772 0.5554
GP 1.4255 1.6036 0.7125 0.7587 0.0747 0.4952
PABIDOT 1.4079 1.4135 0.7003 0.7068 0.6991 0.7048
FMR Values RP: 1.65 GP: 1.85 PABIDOT: 2.50
The mean ranks produced by Friedman’s rank test are presented in the last row of Table 7, with
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the following test statistics: χ2 value of 16.6108, a degree of freedom of 2 and a p-value of 2.4718e-04.
The p-value suggests that the difference between the attack resistance values is significant. The mean
ranks suggest that PABIDOT provides comparatively higher security against the privacy attacks.
5.3.2. Privacy Guarantee
To determine the privacy guarantee of the Φ−separation model, we investigated the dynamics of Φ
against PABIDOT’s resistance to data reconstruction attacks. In this experiment, we used the WCDS
dataset as it is the smallest and most vulnerable dataset against data reconstruction attacks (refer to
Table7). Figure 8a shows the resulting φi (local minimum privacy guarantee) curves for the different
attributes (considered as axes in PABIDOT) of WCDS. The minimum of the φ values available in
each φi curve under each θ are obtained to generate the plot of global minimum privacy guarantees as
shown in Figure 8b. Next, the global maximum of φ values is selected as Φ. As shown on Figure 8b,
the best perturbation parameters for the WCDS dataset are, θoptimal = 35 and Rifoptimal = 4 which
are taken at Φ = 0.7786. In order to determine whether the selected perturbation parameters, that
were determined based on Φ − separation, actually provide enough privacy guarantee, we generated
perturbed datasets for each instance of θ with the best axis of reflection under the corresponding
θ values. To determine the absolute impact of Φ on the analysis, the effect of randomized expansion
and random tuple shuffling were minimized by selecting an input σ value of 0 and finally sorting the
resulting datasets in ascending order. Next, naive snooping, ICA and known I/O attack methods were
used to reconstruct the datasets. Then, the reconstructed datasets were used to produce the min
std(D −Dr) and average std(D −Dr) under each θ instance, where Dr represents the reconstructed
datasets. Next, min std(D−Dr) and average std(D−Dr) were plotted against θ as shown in Figure
9a and Figure 9b respectively. The red colored vertical line indicates the point of Φ. As shown in
Figures 9a and 9b, it’s clear that Φ provides a near optimal point at which PABIDOT produces the
highest min std(D−Dr) and average std(D−Dr). This in fact proves that Φ− separation provides
an empirical privacy guarantee against data reconstruction attacks.
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Figure 8: φ vs. θ. Figure 8a shows variation of the local minimum privacy guarantee (φi) curves for each attribute of
the WCDS dataset. The φi values are utilized to generate the global minimum privacy guarantee (φ) curve as shown in
Figure 8b; PABIDOT considers the global maximum of φ to select the best perturbation parameters. For the WCDS
dataset the best perturbation parameters are θoptimal = 35 and Rifoptimal = 4 which are taken at Φ = 0.7786.
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(a) minimum std(D-Dr) of the reconstructed datasets pro-
duced by the reconstruction attacks against θ.
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Figure 9: minimum std(D-Dr) and average std(D-Dr) of the reconstructed datasets produced by Naive Snooping, ICA
and known I/O. The red vertical lines show the instance of optimal perturbation parameter selection of PABIDOT. The
red lines nearly indicate the point at which the corresponding perturbed dataset provides the highest privacy guarantee.
This provides empirical evidence on PABIDOT providing the optimal privacy by satisfying Φ− separation.
Composition of PABIDOT. PABIDOT performs steps 23 and 25 (refer Algorithm 3) to provide
composition and resistance to complementary release attacks which exploit the vulnerabilities of mul-
tiple perturbed data releases. Figure 10a shows the change of std(D − Dp) against the standard
deviation (σ) of noise used at step 23. The results were produced using the SSDS dataset and IBK
classification algorithm. In a complementary data release, the data owner is opted to release several
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perturbed versions of the dataset consecutively. In each release, the data owner will have to increase
σ in order to increase the deviation of the data by increasing the noise of the dataset. The random
tuple swapping (conducted in step 25) makes the process of direct data linkage unrealistic. As shown
in Figure 10b, the classification accuracy does not get reduced drastically with increasing σ.
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Figure 10: Effect of σ on min(std(D − Dr)) and classification accuracy. When the σ of the randomized expansion is
increased, the minimum std(D−Dp) increases as shown in Figure 10a. However, the classification accuracy shows only
a minimal decrease against increasing σ. This confirms PABIDOT’s capability of maintaining utility at a constant level
while providing increased resistance to increasing randomized expansion.
Membership inference attacks. Membership inference attacks (MI) investigate whether a record
was a member of the training dataset of a model with black-box access. This attack is used to
investigate information leaks in models trained by commercial “machine learning as a service” providers
such as Google and Amazon. [37]. In our proposed work, we work on full data release as depicted in
Figure 1. We assume that only the perturbed data is released and the original data is not accessible
by any third party user. Therefore, PABIDOT is not directly aligned with the concept of any model
release with black box access to them. Nevertheless, it can be important to infer the membership of
the data perturbed by PABIDOT, in a model trained with original data. This investigation is saved
for our future work.
5.3.3. Increase in Information Entropy
The information entropy of the perturbed and the non-perturbed datasets were compared by using
Shannon’s entropy formula given in Equation 43 [35].
H(P ) = −
k∑
i=1
pilog2pi (43)
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Table 8: Average Increase in Information Entropy. The average increase in entropy of perturbed data compared to the
original data was calculated using Equation 44. The positive values show that there is always an increase in entropy,
and that shows that PABIDOT introduces more impurity to the perturbed data.
Dataset Average increase in information entropy
LRDS 11.1933
PBDS 4.1284
SSDS 11.2074
WCDS 1.1671
WQDS 5.9415
FRDS 5.3300
ELDS 7.2458
Table 8 shows the average of the increase in information entropy obtained according to Equation
44. The average increase is positive in all cases, proving that the attributes of the perturbed datasets
have higher information entropies, hence having more impurity compared to original data.
AIG(Dp −D) =
∑k
i=1(H(P
p
i )−H(Pi))
k
(44)
6. Discussion
In this paper, we proposed an efficient perturbation algorithm (named PABIDOT) for preserving
individuals’ privacy in the context of big data. PABIDOT applies perturbation based on a new privacy
model name Φ−separation. We proved that Φ−separation provides an empirical privacy guarantee of
selecting the best perturbation parameters. PABIDOT excels in time efficiency, and the classification
accuracy results of the perturbed dataset are close to that of the original data. This was achieved by
taking a systematic approach to optimizing data perturbation parameters for random axis reflection,
noise translation, and multidimensional concatenated sub-plane rotation followed by the introduction
of novel random noise addition mechanism named as randomized expansion. The utility of PABIDOT
was analyzed in terms of time complexity, scalability, memory consumption, classification accuracy
and biases with post-processing properties. Next, the privacy of PABIDOT was analyzed in terms of
attack resistance, privacy guarantee, composition, and increase in information entropy.
In data classification experiments using three data perturbation methods, PABIDOT outperformed
two related methods: rotation perturbation (RP) and geometric perturbation (GP). Friedman’s rank
test further supports this argument by returning the highest mean rank for PABIDOT’s classification
accuracy results. The classification accuracy of the dataset perturbed by PABIDOT was second only
to that of the original dataset.
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The time complexity of PABIDOT was investigated through analysis and experimentation and is
given as O(n3×m) where n is the number of attributes, and m is the number of tuples in the dataset.
Conventionally a dataset grows by the addition of new tuples, while the number of attributes remains
constant. In case of large datasets, we can consider an inequality between m and n as (m >>> n),
and so the time complexity of PABIDOT is linear (O(m)) for m, i.e. when the number of attributes
remains constant. This indicates the suitability of the proposed perturbation method for big data.
The time consumption experiments exhibit the same pattern, as depicted in Figure 3, and agree with
the time complexity analysis.
Scalability testing also gave good results; runtime analysis showed that PABIDOT completes the
perturbation process much faster than RP or GP. In fact, RP and GP did not converge within the
maximum time (100 hours) given for an individual job in the SGI UV3000 supercomputer. This proves
that the new method is usable for large-scale data perturbation with very low computational overheads.
Memory requirements of PABIDOT are moderate, in our experiments PABIDOT and rotation
perturbation (RP) used less memory than geometric perturbation (GP). According to Friedman’s
rank test, PABIDOT uses less memory than RP, but the p-value suggests that the difference is not
significant. We can conclude that the proposed method works well with datasets that have a substantial
number of tuples and a large number of attributes.
It was concluded that perturbation alters the descriptive statistics, making the resulting data to be
unusable for descriptive statistical analysis. This also suggests that an adversary cannot try to conduct
database inference attacks based on descriptive statistics. PABIDOT has lower levels of type B and
type C biases, which means that PABIDOT does not affect the relationship between the attributes.
Further analysis of biases proved that the probability distributions between the original and perturbed
attributes are affected, meaning that direct mapping between the attributes is not possible.
The privacy guarantee of Φ − separation makes sure that PABIDOT perturbs the dataset with
optimal perturbation parameters for a given instance. The proposed method of randomized expansion
further reduces the possibility of reconstructing the original data. In attack resistance experiments,
PABIDOT showed better protection against attacks that try to restore the original dataset than
RP and GP. PABIDOT applies reverse z-score normalization after the transformations, so the final
attributes’ value ranges are within those of the original dataset. This can reduce the probability of
attacks in the first place, as attackers may not be able to distinguish the original dataset from the
perturbed one.
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PABIDOT resists various attacks as shown in Table 9. In particular, it shows a low level of
vulnerability to ICA based, Known I/O, and Naive inference attacks. Since PABIDOT performs
randomized expansion and random shuffling of the resulting dataset, multiple releases would have only
a minor effect on the privacy it provides. Hence, complementary release attacks that exploit the privacy
loss due to multiple releases do not represent a serious risk. This provides an empirical guarantee of
the composability of PABIDOT with the assumption that the data owner increases the noise factor
(σ) in each sequential data release. Since PABIDOT does not try to minimize information loss over
generalization, minimality attacks [48] do not pose a risk either. In the experiments section, we
pointed out that membership inference has a considerably low level of applicability to PABIDOT. So
we can claim that PABIDOT is practically not vulnerable to membership inference attacks. Distance
inference attacks and Eigen-Analysis are still being investigated, hence, indicated as inconclusive.
Table 9: resistance of the proposed method against existing attacks
AttackMethod
Risk Level
Inconclusive Low Moderate High
Complementary Release X
ICA based X
Known I/O X
Naive Estimation X
Minimality
Membership Inference X
Distance-inference X
Known Sample X
Eigen-Analysis X
Finally, the increase in entropy of the perturbed data was investigated. Higher entropy indicates
increased impurity in a dataset, that is, the higher the entropy, the higher the number of different
records [35]. Consequently, increasing the entropy of a dataset makes the process of reconstructing
the original data more difficult. PABIDOT performs well in this respect; it increases the entropy as
given in Table 8.
In summary, PABIDOT’s suitability for the privacy preservation of big data was demonstrated
from several perspectives. Data perturbation is a low-cost way of preserving privacy, and among
data perturbation methods, PABIDOT proved to be very fast. PABIDOT scales well with linear
complexity for typical scenarios when the number of attributes is a constant. PABIDOT’s memory
usage is comparable to that of the existing methods. PABIDOT also showed better resistance to attacks
on privacy than comparable techniques. There are many practical examples in different domains which
produce big data that contain various private information. For example, healthcare systems maintain
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large amounts of patient data to improve clinical analytics and deliver efficient services to medical staff
and patients [29]. In retail environments, an enormous amount of data are created through customer
transactions [5]. These retail data are vital to seek initiatives to leverage customer services. However,
data stored in these systems include private information that needs protection. If the data are not
appropriately looked after, unanticipated privacy leaks may occur. One of the significant issues in
enforcing privacy is the high dimensions of these data. PABIDOT provides a scalable and efficient
solution that can be effectively used under such challenging environments to preserve the confidentiality
of user data.
Another example is Facebook that has a massive app base, and exploitation of vulnerabilities can
have devastating consequences wrt users’ privacy [39]. Using a robust privacy preserving mechanism
such as PABIDOT could efficiently address these issues. In fact, events like Facebook’s privacy breaches
could have been avoided using a perturbation mechanism such as PABIDOT [39]. Hence, PABIDOT
would not only preserve individual user privacy but also allow other third-party companies to generate
population-based valuable insights without harming the privacy of users.
7. Conclusion
This paper proposed a new perturbation method named PABIDOT in order to address efficiency,
scalability, privacy, usability and utility issues of the existing data perturbation methods. PABIDOT
adds privacy to data by using a newly proposed privacy model named Φ − separation. We provided
empirical evidence that Φ − separation provides sufficient privacy guarantee by efficiently selecting
the best perturbation parameters for PABIDOT’s data perturbation. The asymptotic complexity
of PABIDOT was proven to be linear (O(m)) for m where m is the number of instances and m is
considerably larger than the number of attributes for a given dataset (the number of attributes is often
a constant for a particular dataset). This property enables PABIDOT to deal with large datasets.
The scalability results proved that PABIDOT consumes an extremely low amount of time for the
perturbation of big data. The classification accuracy of the proposed method is very close to that
of the original dataset, and the method outperforms random rotation perturbation and geometric
perturbation in this respect. The composition and privacy guarantee of the proposed algorithm are
additional advantages. Empirical results show that PABIDOT provides good resistance to various
privacy attacks.
Further enhancing the efficiency and scalability of PABIDOT for big datasets can be a new research
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avenue.
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